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PERSPECTIVES ON THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS
CRIME COMMISSION - THE PROBLEM OF DRUNKENNESS
Peter Barton Hutt*
The United States Crime Commission's recommendations concerning
drunkenness offenses can be stated very simply. First, it recommended the
repeal of those laws that handle simple public drunkenness, as distinguished from
disorderly intoxication, as a crime. Second, the Commission recommended that
a comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation program be instituted for inebriates
and alcoholics under public health and welfare auspices to replace antiquated
solutions provided by the present system of criminal law enforcement.' In retrospect, these recommendations may seem obvious. When the Commision began its
work, however, they were far from that, and indeed were regarded by many with
grave suspicion. This article will examine some of the factors that led to the
Commission's action on drunkenness offenses and will consider the impact that
the Commission's work may have upon the future of law enforcement in this
country.
The Commission concluded that the drunkenness statutes mentioned above
should be repealed for three basic reasons: (1) such statutes are ineffective;
(2) they burden the police and courts; and (3) they degrade the criminal
process.' In the year since the Commission issued its Report, no one has seriously
challenged either this conclusion or the findings on which it rested. Indeed, the
recommendation that these drunkenness statutes be repealed has been widely
supported.' Thus, there is no need to re-examine here the validity of the Commission's criticisms of public intoxication laws.
But these criticisms are applicable not only to the public intoxication laws.
They apply with equal force to statutes declaring criminal such offenses as
abortion, adultery, consensual homosexual relations, the use of marijuana, and
prostitution. Such statutes define a public morality rather than protect the
public from harm and violence. The utter futility and harm of proscribing
these other forms of behavior through criminal statutes is even more readily
demonstrable than in the case of public intoxication statutes. What caused the
Commission to concentrate so heavily on the drunkenness laws and virtually
ignore these other statutes? Why were the drunkenness statutes the only criminal statutes, of all the federal and state statutes presently in force, that the
Commission recommended be repealed? Appreciation of some of the factors
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that led to the Commission's recommendation will, I believe, afford a better
perspective for viewing all of the Commission's work.
Undoubtedly the most important factor leading to the Commission's
recommendation for the repeal of public drunkenness statutes was the existence
of two decisions by United States Courts of Appeals holding that chronic alcoholics may not be punished for public intoxication -Easter
v. District of
Columbia4 and Driver v. Hinnant' In 1964, a year before the Commission
was appointed, litigation of these test cases was begun for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of handling chronic alcoholics as criminals under
public intoxication statutes. It has long been recognized that the vast majority
of the inebriates arrested under drunkenness statutes are chronic alcoholics. 6
Indeed, experience in the District of Columbia since Easter shows that perhaps
90 to 95 percent of the drunkenness offenders who appear in court are suffering from this illness.' If the courts were to rule that an alcoholic could not be
convicted of public intoxication, a radical change in the entire approach to
public intoxication would be required throughout the country.
Judgments for the defendants in both Easter and Driver were handed
down in early 1966, when the United States Crime Commission was about
halfway through its deliberations. These two cases could not be ignored. Neither
the Fourth Circuit nor Judge Bryan, who wrote that court's opinion in Driver,'
could be shrugged off as unreasoning radicals. Nor could the unanimous en
banc decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Easter be dismissed
as an unimportant judicial aberration. It was obvious that these decisions were
of major importance to the country and that the Commission's Report had to
deal with the problems that they created.
In contrast, there were no comparable decisions relating to the other behavioral offenses mentioned above. No one had successfully challenged the
constitutionality of the adultery or homosexual conduct laws. Thus, there was
no significant pressure from the courts for the Commission to examine statutes
dealing with those offenses. The Commission therefore relegated consideration
of those offenses to a rather brief discussion, concluding that it was not in a position to resolve the issues involved and suggesting that state legislatures weigh
carefully the kinds of behavior that should be defined as criminal.8
It would be naive, of course, to suggest that the mere existence of Easter
and Driver required the Commission to confront the problem of public drunkenness statutes. As it did with respect to other offenses, the Commission could
simply have recommended that each state resolve this question in its own legislature. Because the Commission's staff, and particularly Mr. Gerald Stem,
forcefully pressed the Commission to make a substantive resolution of the issue,
this simple recommendation was not made. Strong advocacy from Mr. Stern
and other members of the staff was eventually reflected in the final Commission
4
5
6
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recommendations.' Yet it must also be remembered that equally strong advocacy for a substantive resolution of analogous problems -notably
the use of
marijuana and homosexual conduct-did not prevail upon the Commission.
One reason for this seemingly inconsistent result was the extent of law enforcement resources committed to the treatment of the drunkenness problem. The
Commission discovered that in 1965 two million arrests -one
of every three
arrests in the United States - were for the simple offense of public drunkenness." An additional large number of arrests for drunkenness were made under
disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, and other related misdemeanor statutes."
The cost of these arrests in terms of police, court, and correctional resources was
incalculable. It was estimated that, in some areas, 90 percent of the inmates
of short-term correctional institutions at any given time had been convicted of
intoxication. 2 Police spent millions of hours simply picking up incapacitated
citizens again and again and waiting in crowded criminal courts to testify only
that an unfortunate derelict was, indeed, drunk on the occasion specified.
None of the other morality offenses previously mentioned commands an
even remotely comparable expenditure of law enforcement resources. However
much the infamous peep-hole vice squads may degrade the entire criminal
process, they represent a relatively small expenditure of time and money. Indeed,
some of the morality offenses, such as adultery, are dead letters and therefore
entail no waste of law enforcement resources.
It must be remembered that the Commission viewed its mandate from
the President to consider only recommendations with regard to the enforcement and administration of justice, not the revision of substantive law. It
was therefore natural that, unless a given problem of substantive law directly
and substantially impinged upon the functioning of the law enforcement process,
the Commission was disinclined to deal with it. Only with respect to drunkenness, out of all the morality offenses, could this substantial impact be readily
demonstrated.
There was no substantial element of American society that stood out
in solid opposition to repeal of the drunkenness statutes. Under early English
common law, drunkenness without disorderly conduct was not a crime. Simple public intoxication was first made a criminal offense in England by a
statute enacted in 1606, entitled "An Act for Repressing the Odious and Loathsome Sin of Drunkenness."" The drunkenness statutes have a very clear origin
in biblical disapproval of intoxication, culminating in the experiment with
Prohibition in this country. But since the repeal of Prohibition with the twentyfirst amendment, the moral issue has subsided. Even the Methodist Church,
which led the movement for the eighteenth amendment, now agrees that
drunkenness should no longer be considered a criminal offense.'
Many
judges, doctors, correctional officials, and law enforcement personnel have,
9 See Id. at 235-37.
10 Id. at 233.
11 TASK FORCE REPORT:
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over the years, voiced unusually strong views that the drunkenness laws make
no sense. 5 This virtual unanimity of informed public opinion permitted the
Commission to deal with the drunkenness problem with far greater confidence
than if it had been a more controversial issue.
There is, in contrast, no consensus on the proper handling of abortion,
adultery, the use of marijuana, or other similar questions of morality. The
myths created by the Bureau of Narcotics- that marijuana causes crime and

leads to heroin addiction--will undoubtedly be exposed to public ridicule
at some time in the future, paving the way for needed reform in this area also."
But the issue is still too charged with emotion and irrationality for a presidential
commission to deal with it comfortably today. Indeed, even the issue of private consensual relationships between adult homosexuals could not be confronted because of such an atmosphere, despite the fact that the Wolfenden

Committee in England"7 and the American Law Institute' have resolved it
sensibly. Perhaps the failure to obtain implementation of the recommendations
of these two groups in either England or the United States convinced the
Commission that it should not delve into these potentially controversial areas.
It must also be recognized that any discussion by the Commission of these explosive moral issues might well have diverted public attention from its more important findings and recommendations.
In the case of drunkenness, moreover, the Commission could also rely upon
the well-established medical view that alcoholism is a disease. In 1956, the
American Medical Association officially recognized alcoholism as a disease that
9
It has reiterated this posiis properly within the purview of medical practice.
tion on numerous occasions since then and has advocated repeal of public
intoxication statutes. Thus, the Commission had a clear statement from medical
authorities that, even though our public health resources may be strained to the
breaking point, they nevertheless recognized that the handling of drunkenness
was properly a function of the medical profession rather than a function of the
criminal system.
The Commission's handling of drunkenness offenses was also undoubtedly
buttressed by the recommendations of the President's Commission on Crime
in the District of Columbia. The D.C. Crime Commission Report, which was
completed several months before the United States Crime Commission Report,
2
recommended repeal of the District of Columbia's public intoxication law. "
And like the United States Crime Commission, the D.C. Crime Commission
had felt that it should deal only with problems of the administration of justice
and leave substantive law reform to a later law revision commission. Thus, of
the morality offenses, the D.C. Crime Commission dealt only with the problem
of public drunkenness. Although this did not compel the United States Crime
15
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Commission's approach, it certainly encouraged it. Had the Commission ignored
the drunkenness problem, or not resolved it, it might have looked somewhat
unusual after the very strong and detailed report made by the D.C. Crime
Commission.
Finally, one must take into consideration the Crime Commission's members
themselves. I have not conducted any research into their personal habits or
private lives, and I would not suggest that I or anyone else do so. Nevertheless,
a few generalizations can properly be made. First, it is likely that almost every
member of the Commission consumes alcoholic beverages. It is virtually certain
that they have friends and relatives who have drinking problems and may even
be alcoholics. Not only have they seen friends and relatives drunk in public, in
violation of criminal statutes, but at some time in their lives they may well have
violated these same criminal statutes themselves. In fact, I doubt that there
are many Americans today who have not, at one time or other, violated a public
drunkenness statute. It must be remembered that one need not be unconscious
or offensive to violate the law. It is sufficient simply to be intoxicated. All that
is required in most jurisdictions is the word of a policeman that he smelled liquor
on your breath and that you were not walking in an absolutely straight line.
The Commission members undoubtedly found it relatively easy to recommend the repeal of a type of criminal statute that sweeps under its broad terms
the everyday conduct of many friends and relatives, and perhaps even their
own past activity. They live in a society that condones drinking and tolerates
even excessive drinking. Current social mores therefore preconditioned them to
acceptance of the position that drunkenness should be handled as a public health
problem rather than as a criminal problem.
In contrast, I think it fair to assume that something less than a majority
of the Commission members smoke marijuana or have performed an abortion
or have engaged in prostitution. Nor do they live in a society in which these
activities are regularly exposed to public view without condemnation. Thus, the
Commission members were undoubtedly predisposed by prevailing social mores
to avoid these particular issues.
Social mores do, of course, change with succeeding generations. They are
obviously changing today. It neither denigrates the Commission nor condemns
today's younger generation to point out that if the President had appointed
nineteen representative college students instead of the people he did appoint,
the Commission would have been more inclined to recommend the repeal of
marijuana laws than to recommend the repeal of drunkenness statutes. And
from what I know of both problems, at least as strong a case can be made for
repealing the marijuana laws. In any event, although this problem of the
generation gap certainly is not the sole explanation for the Commission's actions,
failure to recognize it as an important factor would be naive indeed.
It is equally important to recognize a factor that was not involved in the
Commissions deliberations. It is quite dear that the recommendations on
drunkenness were entirely ad hoc conclusions rather than an attempt to formulate
general jurisprudential principles governing the proper function of the criminal
law in preserving the moral values of society. The Commission did not under-
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take to resolve the great debate between John Stuart Mill and H.L.A. Hart on
the one hand, and Lord Devlin and Professor James Fitzjames Stephen on the
other. ' I doubt that many Commission members are even familiar with that
debate. The Commission acted upon very practical considerations in this area,
not on philosophical doctrines.
The Commission has recently been criticized for failing to enunciate in
its Report any underlying doctrine of the criminal law.22 In the first place it
is doubtful that any nineteen persons of diverse backgrounds could possibly agree
on such an abstract principle. For practical reasons I am rather happy
that the attempt was not made. I doubt that any Presidential Commission could
sufficiently divorce itself from purely political considerations to give adequate
dispassionate consideration to such a task. Even if uncontrovertible evidence
showed the utter foolishness of retaining private moral standards as criminal
prescriptions, respected public figures might not wish to put themselves in the
position of seeming to advocate the abandonment of widely-accepted moral
principles. If an attempt had been made to develop some all-encompassing
principle governing the criminal law, I fear that the recommendations made
with respect to drunkenness would have been sacrificed in the process.
Thus, I am content with the approach that evolved. And I would certainly
hope that, in the future, new commissions will be established that can again
recommend piecemeal ad hoc reforms in the criminal law comparable to the
recommendations on drunkenness made by this Commission. Eventually, the criminal statutes embodying private moral standards will be abolished, and we will
look back on them as rather ludicrous examples of paternalistic oppression. I
personally look forward to that day.
I shall now consider what the future holds for the Commission's recommendations about drunkenness. Ironically, it appears that they may be the first
of the Commission's recommendations to be implemented throughout the country. And if this happens, it may well lead to reform in other areas of the criminal law.
In the District of Columbia, the Easter decision has led to revolutionary
changes in the handling of public inebriates. Some 5,000 individuals, most of
them homeless derelicts or indigents, have now been adjudicated chronic alcoholics. Under Easter, they can no longer be jailed for their public intoxication.
This has, in turn, forced the development of substantial treatment facilities for
alcoholics in the District. Not all of the D.C. Crime Commission's recommendations have yet been put into effect, but definite progress has been made.
Shortly after the D.C. Crime Commission Report was released to the
public, legislation was introduced in Congress to repeal the District's public
intoxication statute and to enact public health, welfare and rehabilitation procedures for the handling of inebriates and alcoholics. The House of Represen-

21 See H. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963); Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals
(1959); J. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873); J. Mill, On Liberty (1859).
22 See Packer, Copping Out, The New York Review of Books, Oct. 12, 1967.
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tatives has now passed that bill, and it appears likely that it will be enacted into

23
law within the next few months.

The same thing is about to happen on a national scale as a result of Powell
v. Texas, which raises the same issue as the Easter and Driver cases. A brief
filed for nine amid curiae points out to the Court that the only real chance of
obtaining widespread implementation of the United States Crime Commission's
recommendations is through judicial action. The amici urge that, in effect,
Powell will determine whether public intoxication is handled as a public health
problem or is continued as a criminal offense. The identity of the amici who urge
that the Court's decision in Powell follow Easter and Driver is important. They
include the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Medical Association,
the Correctional Association of New York, the Methodist Board of Christian
Social Concerns, the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs, the
North American Judges Association, the North Conway Institute, the Texas
Commission on Alcoholism, and the Washington D.C. Area Council on Alcoholism.
If the Supreme Court were to uphold the State of Texas in Powell and
rule that alcoholism is not a defense to public intoxication, I would be very
pessimistic about the possibility of convincing any state legislature to repeal its
drunkenness statute. Derelict alcoholics wield no political power. And repeal
of the intoxication statute can too easily be misunderstood by an unsophisticated
public as an immoral invitation to debauchery and licentiousness. Thus, the
possibility of a legislator championing criminal reform in this area, absent a
court decision forcing the issue, is very small indeed. I am convinced, however,
that the Supreme Court will not uphold the lower court decision in Powell. I
believe that the Court will follow Easter and Driver and that the issue will be
forced throughout the country. When that happens, the recommendations of
the Crime Commission will prove extremely important.
The Commission's recommendations concerning the type of procedures
that should replace the criminal handling of inebriates are rather brief, but
nonetheless explicit. Like the D.C. Crime Commission, the United States Crime
Commission recommended essentially three stages of treatment. An incapacitated
inebriate must first be detoxified, or sobered up. The Commission recommended
that this be done in a medical center, preferably a hospital, rather than in a
police precinct. It must be remembered that delirium tremens, the withdrawal
symptoms of alcoholism, are more dangerous to human life than the withdrawal
symptoms from a hard narcotic like morphine.25 The second stage should consist of intensive in-patient treatment to dry out the patient and formulation of
detailed treatment program for the future. Hopefully, this stage will be held
to a bare minimum amount of time. Incarceration in a health facility for a
substantial-period of time, like incarceration in jail, is likely to cripple any
23 H.R. 14330. See also Hearings on H.R. 6143 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
24 36 U.S.L.W. 3142 '(U.S. Oct. 10, 1967); oral argument reported, 36 U.S.L.W. 3353
(U.S. March 12, 1968).
25 World Health Organization Expert Committee on Alcohol and Alcoholism, Report,
Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 94, at 6-7, 11 (June, 1955).
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chances of rehabilitation by developing dependence upon the institution itself.
The third, and by far the most important stage, is outpatient treatment. It is
evident that outpatient treatment must become the primary focus for any substantial attack upon alcoholism and intoxication. Related to this, the Crime Commission found that the homeless, derelict alcoholics who comprise the vast
majority of those arrested for drunkenness in our cities cannot be treated without supportive residential housing that can be used as a base from which to
reintegrate them into society.
Both the United States and D.C. Crime Commissions flatly recommended
voluntary treatment for alcoholics.2 6 They recognized that involuntary civil
commitment procedures are as inappropriate and as punitive as criminal incarceration. State legislatures, which are accustomed to thinking in terms of
involuntary civil commitment for mental illness, may be somewhat disinclined
to accept this recommendation. Thus, substantial time and effort must be
expended by the medical and legal professions if voluntary treatment is to be
accepted and if future litigation concerning civil commitment procedures is to
be avoided.
There are, I believe, important stakes riding on the success of the attempt
to take drunkenness out of the criminal system. This attempt represents a
major effort to reform our criminal law. Ironically, in a certain sense the Commission picked the most difficult area of all in which to test the feasibility of
criminal law reform. The problem of drunkenness will not vanish with repeal
of the public intoxication statutes. And society undoubtedly will not permit
the streets to be littered with unconscious inebriates. Repeal of the drunkenness
laws therefore requires establishment of a new system for handling the problem
in a more humane and more effective way. In contrast, such private behavior
as adultery, the use of marijuana, and homosexual conduct need no alternative
handling. They are "public problems" only because the criminal law defines
them as such. If the statutes were repealed, this conduct would no longer be
a public problem.
The massive difficulties involved in a nationwide changeover from handling public drunkenness under the criminal law to the use of new public health
procedures can, of course, be alleviated by the support and leadership of the
federal government. Recently, the President sent to Congress a proposed
Alcoholism Rehabilitation Act to accomplish this purpose.2 This proposed
legislation, which is intended to anticipate the Supreme Court's decision in
Powell, should provide a major impetus for implementation of the United States
Crime Commission's recommendations. It will be many years before the success
of these recommendations can be gauged. I firmly believe, however, that they
will prove to be of great importance to law enforcement in this country.
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